Until now, there has been a status quo between the Supreme Court and the Knesset. Each of the branches tried hard not to intrude in the other's affairs. I consider the High Court of
Justice ruling a very serious matter. . . . Perhaps on this occasion an insignificant section was under discussion, but henceforth they [the judges] will be able to annul significant laws, and so a new reality will be created . . . . [T]his decision sets the stage for the court's intervention in the legislative activity of the Knesset. Such intervention is unwarranted, and the Knesset needs to state its opinion on this matter... The Knesset is sovereign, not the Court. The Court can recommend that the Knesset amend the law which the Court feels is a contradiction of the Basic Laws, but it can't revoke a law on its own say-so. 5 These words focus on a presumed new reality in which the Israeli Court counteracted parliamentary sovereignty. Yet this statement ignores two additional facets of the matter. First, the Israeli Court has more than once struck down primary legislation, and the Knesset stated its opinion on those occasions. Second, the Israeli Supreme Court's docket should be checked and analyzed along with, and in light of, the legislature's actions and reactions to the decisions.
This article argues that the proper analysis of counter-majoritarian arguments against Supreme Courts and judicial activism in any constitutional system obliges one to simultaneously look into the actions and powers of the decision-making institutions (notably those of the legislature), as well as their interplay and interrelations. Specifically, this article will compare how the Israeli and Canadian policymakers addressed their responses to similar judicial features and thus substantiate the collating. 6 As shall be elaborated shortly, in both countries a court's declaration of unconstitutionality could be successfully counteracted by the legislature. Thus, the legislature's modes of retort should be considered an important component in analyzing the relevancy of the counter-majoritarian problem to any political system. Part II briefly discusses the American-type, classic counter-majoritarian difficulty and the arguments suggested in the literature to undermine or overcome it, while elaborating on the constitutional dialogue theory as a possible solution. Part III presents the Israeli case study, focusing on the very first cases in which the Israeli Court struck down laws. Part IV works through the meaning of constitutional dialogues by suggesting a subtle distinction between two kinds of dialogues: substantive and formal. Both parts V and VI contextually compare some Canadian and Israeli examples by interpreting formal and substantive dialogues occurring in each system. Part VII delves into the question of the responsibility to engage in dialogues, and Part VIII examines whether there are grounds for the theory that constitutional structures affect constitutional dialogues and concludes that they are not necessarily associated, after reviewing the experiences of other countries. This article concludes with a few general comments on the nuances of counter-majoritarianism.
II. COUNTER-MAJORITARIANISM AT EASE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE
In a nutshell, the counter-majoritarian (or anti-majoritarian) objection to judicial review assumes a situation in which unelected and unaccountable judges are "vested with the power to strike down the laws that were enacted by the duly elected representatives of the people". According to this view, the Court exercises its power of review contrary to the will of national majorities, undermining the policy and decision making institutions." 8 Thus, counter-majoritarianism is an anomaly in a democratic society.
While the expansion of the Court's judicial review power has become a worldwide phenomenon, so has the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Supreme Courts all over the world, including those of Canada and Israel, are being charged with encroaching on the powers of elected officials. 9 Over the course of the years, many theorists attempted to solve the difficulty, to benumb its sting or to deny it altogether. Robert Dahl, for example, has suggested that "the policy views dominant in the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States." 20 According to his position, the Court is usually an institution that supports the majority politics of the dominant coalition. Thus, a Court's striking down laws does not really pose any substantial threat to democracy, and the overall danger of Court's i8. Such undermining can take many forms: not only can it displace a current majoritarian decision, but it can also distort and debilitate future ones. See countering majority will is empirically mitigated. 2 The same argument was recently. made with respect to the Canadian Supreme Court: in a study on one-hundred constitutional rulings handed down between 1996 and 1998, it was found that the Supreme Court posed no challenge to parliamentary sovereignty . 22 Mark Graber has proposed that the anti-majoritarian difficulty is actually a non-majoritarian one, as "justices . . . declare state and federal practices unconstitutional only when the dominant national coalition is unable or unwilling to settle some public dispute . . . [and] prominent elected officials consciously invite the judiciary to resolve those political controversies that they cannot or would not address. "2 Accordingly, courts do not act when there is a clear and certain majority for the specific law at issue, and thus, they are not counter-majoritarian institutions. 24 Inevitably, according to this approach, the difficulty is diminished by the fact that our initial assumption about the presence of an identified majority has been proven wrong. Professor Graber posits that in most cases clashing majorities are indeed involved. Hence, the priority of governments is to avoid deciding controversial moral issues, leaving them to be decided by the courts. If courts so decide, the self-interest of government is upheld; courts deciding non-majority issues are acting according to the officials' preferences. Thus, these decisions cannot be counter-majoritarian.
In the same vein, a somewhat variant approach to tackling the difficulty has recently taken root. Containing both normative and empirical cores, the dialogue theory suggests that counter-majoritarianism might be overcome if one acknowledges that courts and legislatures are engaged in a continuous dialogue. Rather than being the final determination of a contested issue, a court's decision to annul a law or declare a governmental action invalid can be the starting point or stimulus of public debate. The legislature or the executive, the policy-making institutions, are indeed the ones to articulate the final constitutional solution in light of, and in accordance with, a court's decision. 25 In such circumstances, majority will is not circumvented, it is 21 . See Decision-Making in a Democracy, supra note 20, at 294. Courts participate in shaping governmental policies in an appropriate and suitable manner, not by dictating them. The constitutional dialogue approach, instead of identifying the Court's striking down a law duly enacted by the legislature as the critical moment for analyzing the counter-majoritarian action, studies the issue in a broader context. It concentrates not only on the period following a judgment but also on the period preceding the Court's determination. It further focuses on the legislature's reaction more than on the Court's action -that is, on the ameliorated potential of subsequent legislative action. Using empirical data, this approach projects a normative response to the dilemma: if dialogues take place between courts and legislatures and if these dialogues result in the better articulation of the legislature's will the court is not countermajoritarian but an institution upholding majoritarianism on the one hand, and civil or minority rights on the other. 26 This seems to be the appropriate perspective to probe concerns that courts run counter to democratic principles. Any assertion with respect to counter-majoritarianism should include an assessment of the political institutions' actions and reactions, resistance or compliance, and modifications or performances. Any observation on the courts' power should emanate from a broader analysis of how the political branches used their own legitimate power to respond to courts' democratic "deviations. " 27 spoken, has been acknowledged by many scholars in many different jurisdictions. For the American version of the argument see GERALD N: ROSENBERG 
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Such a broad outlook recently found its way into the Canadian discourse. 28 However, as the next sections will suggest in a rather general manner Canadian commentators have paid little attention to the different types of dialogues that courts and legislatures engage in or to their different meanings. 29 In contrast, the Israeli scholastic critique still focuses primarily on the Court's action. 30 It is the Court's decisions, rather than the legislature's responses, that govern the debate in Israel. The next section therefore aims at filling this gap: tracing the Israeli governmental address to the first instances in which the Court struck down laws, while analyzing and interpreting the actions that both preceded and followed those judicial decisions..
Before proceeding, one remark should be made to with respect to the Israeli constitutional system. Due to the absence of a formal written constitution or bill of rights, parliamentary supremacy was accepted as the governing principle of Israel's constitutional regime, as attempts to persuade the Court to review primary legislation traditionally received a negative response. 3 Israel still does not have a full written constitution. Yet the principle of parliamentary supremacy has suffered significant encroachments with the introduction of the two 1992 Basic Laws. 32 Thus, the Israeli deviation from the classical counter-majoritarian problem should be considered: the state could have, at least prior to 1992, prevented the decision to strike down its laws or easily restored the proper order of powers once an annulling decision has been handed. A failure to act in this manner, might point to a different problem. The following sections and the previously quoted statement made by the Knesset Member should be read with this in mind. The common interpretation of the ending words "save by a majority of the members of Knesset" was that at least 61 out of the 120 members should vote favorably for the changing of the section -this is also known as a special majority. 3 
III. THE ISRAELI EXAMPLE -RESPONDING BEFORE AND AFTER

a
In all three cases, the Court found that the challenged law infringed the entrenched clause and thus declared it void. As shall soon become evident, the Court's competence and jurisdiction to decide the cases (the justiciability issue) was not contested' either before, or after, the judicial determination. Furthermore, the legislature's subsequent actions in response to the Court's decision missed some important features, resulting in a very futile -and what I will later refer to as formal -dialogue. 36. The fourth case, Laor, will not be dealt with directly, for two reasons; that case was not translated in the SELECTED JUDGMIENTS series, thus the English reader will be unable to access it. Furthermore, the case evolved around a relatively marginal question of whether a law's pre-reading procedure (as opposed to the three-reading process) is also subject to the absolute majority requirement found in section 4 of the Basic Law: The Knesset.
37. It is worth mentioning that section 4 was entrenched once more by section 46 of the Basic Law, which reads as follows: "The majority required by this Law for changing section 4, 44, or 45 shall be required for decisions of the Knesset plenary at every stage of lawmaking...In this section, "change" means both an express and an implied change." Id.
38. See Barak-Erez, supra note 10, at 326.
A. In-Court Reluctance: The State Representatives' Arguments
The afore-mentioned entrenched clause was at the center of a 1969 petition submitted by a Tel-Aviv lawyer named Bergman. 39 The petitioner challenged the validity of a new law passed by the Knesset that dealt with the endowment of public funding to support the election campaigns of political parties. ' The law provided that public funding would be granted only to those parties represented in the outgoing Knesset. The petitioner claimed the law discriminated against new parties running and campaigning for the Knesset for the very first time, thus infringing the principle of equal election laid down in the entrenched clause. Since the required majority did not pass the law, Bergman argued that it should be struck down.
The petition raised a number of fundamental structural constitutional issues for the very first time. First, the status of Basic Laws, vis-h-vis other laws, had never before been determined. The issue of whether an entrenched section in a Basic Law could invalidate later legislation remained an open question." Second, the Knesset's authority to bind itself by entrenched clauses had yet to be settled. 4 2 Third, the petitioner's standing to challenge the legislation was questionable. 43 Finally, and most importantly, the Court's competence to decide on the validity of primary legislation, even if entrenched, was at stake. Recall that such competence is not grounded in a written constitution or any other legal document and has never before been exercised."
Notwithstanding the potentially fatal flaws of the petition, the Attorney General asked the Court for a ruling on the merits, and consequently the 45 The Attorney General's arguments were confined to rebutting the petitioner's material arguments and to sustaining the validity of the new law. The Court unanimously rejected the Attorney General's arguments and held that the new legislation violated the equality principle to an unjustifiable degree and thus should not be enforced.6 Notably, the Court suggested two paths that were open to the legislature if it wished to fix the defect of the void law. First, the Knesset could leave the law intact, provided that it reeaacted it. by a special majority. 47 Alternatively, the Knesset could amend the law by replacing the discriminatory provision with a provision that would balance the Knesset's interest with the equality principle prescribed in the Basic Law."'
In 1981, a second petition, in the Agudat Derekh Eretz case, challenging a law' that allegedly infringed the entrenched provision, was brought before the Court. 49 In this petition, the Elections (Mode of Propaganda) Law-a law regulating the free radio and television broadcasting 48. In the Court's words:
In the Knesset debates on the Financing Law, the merits of a method of finance based on the balance of party power in the outgoing (sixth) Knesset was contrasted with a method based on the new party balance in the incoming (seventh) Knesset. The Knesset preferred the first method and one of its main reasons for so doing was the danger that short-lived lists would be formed because of the temptation to receive an advance on the funding allocation. 
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time for parties participating in the elections-was challenged. 5 0 The amendment decreased the time allocated to new parties, while simultaneously considerably increasing the time allocated to those parties who participated in the outgoing Knesset. Two associations that intended to introduce a new party argued the amendment infringed the equality principle of the entrenched provision, and, since the required majority did not pass it, it should be struck down.
The petitioners' right to standing in this case was rather obvious, yet the question of the case's justiciability remained challengeable. The then state attorney, following his predecessor in the Bergman case, asked for a ruling on the merits, stating explicitly he would not dispute the case's justiciability, nor the Court's competence to review the legislation." All five justices held that the law in question infringed the equality principle and, as it was not enacted in accordance with the entrenched clause's requirements, was invalid. 5 2 Within less than a year, the third petition, Rubinstein, et al. v . Chairman of the Knesset, et al., concerning the same entrenched clause was brought before the Court for review. 53 The petitioners in this case were Knesset members of a relatively small party, who claimed to be harmed by a retroactive amendment to the election campaign spending law that was supported by the biggest parties. A third state representative preferred not to raise a plea of non-justiciability and again asked the Court for a ruling on the merits. While preparing for the tenth Knesset elections, several parties exceeded the campaign spending limits set forth in the Elections Financing Law which compensated the parties from the public funding budget. After the elections, the Knesset amended the Elections Financing Law retroactively, raising the spending limits and reducing the sanctions imposed on any party that exceeded its budget. An ordinary majority passed the amendment. The petitioners, leaders of a party which adhered to the original spending limits, argued that the retroactive amendment violated the principle of equality in the elections, and as the majority requirement was not sustained, the amendment was invalid. The five justices were unanimous in accepting the petition. See id.
54. See id. at 66. 55. The Israeli Attorneys General, as well as state attorneys, have the exclusive power to represent the State in all courts, and they are defending the State, the Government and Government organs when they are being sued in the courts. It is their role to represent and give Three different state representatives have followed the same path: they have all avoided contesting the justiciability of the constitutional question at issue, while asking the Court to dismiss the petitions on their merits. It should be noted that this approach was also taken with respect to another fundamental issue: the Israeli High Court's jurisdiction to decide petitions submitted by the inhabitants of the Gaza and the West Bank territories administered by Israel since 1967. For more than ten years, Israeli Councils of State abstained from arguing that the Israeli Court did not have the jurisdiction to hear those petitions, limiting themselves to arguing that the petitions should be dismissed on their merits. 56 They have acted in that manner even though there are international legal precedents that support the position that the Israeli Court did not have jurisdiction." This is but another example of State representatives narrowing the scope of the dialogue, which engages themselves and the Court.
The motivations behind these litigation strategies are not well known. It has been speculated that time constraints led the state representatives to follow this strategy. 58 
First, even if time limitations enforced prompt and pointed decisions in both the Bergman and the Agudat Derekh Eretz cases, they were not relevant in the Rubinstein case because it was submitted and decided long after the elections took place; thus, thoroughly delving into the questions of justiciability and jurisdiction was indeed possible. Second, it is highly unlikely that the issue of how to allocate financial aid between parties' electoral campaigns, once it was agreed that it would come from the public purse, was controversial. The issues decided in these three cases do not go to the essence of human rights; they are not the conventional "hot potatoes" like abortion, freedom of expression, or gay rights thrown to the Courts by reluctant and indecisive politicians. They touch on more formal, technical, and structural aspects concerning the structure of government, and only indirectly on the essence of equal opportunity to be elected. 5 9 Third and most importantly, these were not cases in which a political majority could not have been obtained. Quite the contrary, a special majority reenacted the disputed laws in all three of the cases.
It may have been a mistake for the state representatives to limit the issues to be decided in these petitions by narrowing the scope of their legal arguments. They might have inadequately represented the interests of their clients. 60 However, the legislative body could have mended the situation by taking measures to ameliorate the Courts' decisions. More specifically, it could have taken action to negate the Court's declaration that the law was of no force and to restate parliamentary supremacy. 6 As shall be illustrated presently, that is not quite what the Knesset has chosen to do.
B. In-House Reluctance: The Parliament Response
Recall that after declaring for the very first time that a law was of no effect in Bergman, the Court suggested two alternative ways to amend the It is noteworthy that in Israel, where it is still contended that judicial review of interference with human rights is unacceptable because it causes the courts to slip into the determination of value-laden political questions, thejudicial adjudication of questions related to the structure of government and to the relationships between its various branches arouses less opposition because of the more technical/legal appearance of those issues. Id 60. It has been suggested that if the American Solicitor General undermines a sound argument, the government may think she is misusing her office, and that such sound arguments may very well include issues of justiciability or standing. 61. It is worth emphasizing again that at the time it was not obvious that the Israeli Court had the competence to declare that a law was of no effect. The recent statement by the Knesset Speaker that even now, the Israeli High Court lacks the authority to annul legislation and that the Knesset is sovereign, plainly attests to that point. See supra Part 1.
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6 2 Yet, the Knesset, in response, "did not choose between the alternatives but adopted them both. "o Not only did following the Court's suggestion outright change the law, but it was also re-enacted by a special majority." Simultaneously, the Knesset passed an additional law, again by a special majority, retrospectively confirming the validity of all legislation concerning election procedures that had been previously enacted. ' After the Court spoke for a second time in the Agudat Derek/h Eretz decision, the legislature responded in a similar fashion, only slightly modifying the inequality provision before swiftly re-enacting the law with the required majority.6 Following the decision in the Rubinstein case, those parties that exceeded the permitted spending ceiling returned the surplus amounts to the Treasury, and the law was re-enacted by a majority of Knesset members. 67 However, after the elections for the Twelfth Knesset, it was once again retroactively amended to increase the permitted spending limits, and, by a series of acts, the Knesset confirmed the validity of this change by a special majority. ' Thus, in each of the cases, the legislature reacted by re-enacting the statutes and by implementing the Court's advice. The legislature did not reverse the judicial decision; it also did not avoid future decisions of the kind by restructuring the Basic Laws, reshaping the entrenched provision, or challenging the Court's authority to strike down laws in the first place. Yet, the Knesset, in its retroactive ratification following the Bergman case, did signal its protest and its desire to avoid Court challenges to its legislation in the future. By so doing, I suggest, the Knesset flagged its reluctance to participate in nascent dialogues. It also indicated that it was not totally persuaded that it had erred in other legislation.
62.
See supra notes 47-48 and the accompanying text. There could have been no mistake that one of these two alternatives was sufficient. Indeed, the Knesset was well aware of that. See also The Knesset Protocols, Jul. 14, 1969. Knesset Member Avraham Vardiger mentions, "(t)he Supreme Court showed us in its decision two ways of which we should choose." Id. at 2 (in Hebrew).
63. 
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IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES A CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE?
A constitutional dialogue starts with a governmental action being taken, for example, by the legislature. An individual balks, asserting a violation of a structural guarantee. The Court issues its decision. The public notices the decision, and articles are written commenting on the Court's decision. More lawsuits are brought before the courts. Legislatures act.6
Constitutional dialogues can take many forms. They can be limited or broad in scope with respect to both time and participants. A dialogue can start with a legislative committee debating a possible challenge to a suggested law, or it can start with the judicial decision striking down that law. It can end with the implementation of the Court's decision, or it may end with a newly enacted law articulated by the competent legislative body. ' The participants can include some or all of the following: courts, legislatures, Attorneys General or Solicitors General, opinion-makers, individuals, interest groups, and the general public.
The Court's contributions to the dialogue are relatively easy to identify; they are found in the Court's decision to strike down a law. This is the case even if the implications of the decision on future cases are hard to determine, if the reasoning is contestable or vague, if it was decided unanimously or even if it was decided in dissent. Regardless of the context, the Court's input into the dialogue is quite clear: it is found in the decision itself. However, the contributions of the other participants, especially those of the political branches, are a little more elusive and difficult to recognize. Do these contributions include the first legislative initiative that triggered the constitutional challenge (i.e. the challenged law) and the debates that may or may not have revolved around that law at different legislative stages? 7 '
Furthermore, do they include the state Attorney General's position and litigation strategies in such cases?' Finally, which kind of legislative acts This last quandary is not merely semantic. The legislature's response to a Court's striking down a law can take many different forms. Yet the different modes of action suggest different degrees of commitment and participation in the constitutional dialogue. Indeed, the general usage of the concept of dialogue obscures important differences between types of legislative responses that should be analyzed. 74 These different kinds of responses vary in their meaning and essence. The ensuing discussion delineates a distinction between two different sorts of possible constitutional dialogues: substantive and formal.
A. The Substantive Dialogue
Webster's Dictionary defines "dialogue" as "an open and frank interchange, exchange and discussion of ideas and opinions in the seeking of mutual harmony." 7 5 Based on this definition, it is my position that a substantive constitutional dialogue should be defined as one in which the parties participating are themselves committed to and engaged in a search for a harmonious solution that will contain both the Court's interpretation of a constitutional question and the legislature's interest. A substantive dialogue is realized only when the input of both the dialogists leads to the final state of the law. When a substantive dialogue develops, the Court's decision articulates the flaws of particular legislation which results in its being struck down, whereas the legislature on its own initiative includes in its response solutions for achieving its goal in light of the Court's decision. It may very well be that the Court's decision and the legislature's action will coalesce. For example, sometimes the legislature overreached or undermined democracy or the very rules it formerly set for itself. The Court then declares such encroachments as unconstitutional. The legislature restricts its action to conform to the Court's declaration. After all, legislatures can be definitions of 'spouse' in legislation excluded same-sex couples, and to argue only that the exclusion was in accordance with section 1 of the Charter. 
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persuaded that they have wronged. Yet, if a substantive dialogue has taken place, such a response is the fruit of the legislature's deliberations on the Court's declaration and of its acknowledgment that it has exceeded its powers. In substantive dialoguing, the correspondence of the Court's declaration and the legislature's response is achieved after these two committed public agencies have deliberated the matter in question, each in its own turn, and reached the preferred alternative.
B. The Formal Dialogue
Dialogue is also defined simply as a conversation between two or more participants. 7 6 This somewhat narrow definition is quite different from the afore-mentioned one. A conversation between two parties can take the form of one participant formulating a solution and the other utterly agreeing. It can also take the form of one party enforcing its own interpretation over the other participant's. Finally, it can also take the form of one party expressing its opinion, and the other participant refusing to listen altogether.
A formal dialogue, I propose, takes place when the legislative action adds nothing to the final articulation of the constitutional solution; it does not add any content to the court's decision, except for "rubber-stamping" it with the relevant legislative process. 77 A formal dialogue occurs when the final formal act is that of the legislature, but the final words are those of the Court. This type of response is characterized by the reluctance of the one or more participants to acknowledge their overreaching or to thoroughly ponder the others' objections in considering alternatives.
A formal dialogue also occurs when a legislature uses its power to hamper future dialogues or limit current ones. Presumably, this type of dialogue is not available in every legal system. Yet it is possible in countries without a constitution, where the principle of parliamentary supremacy reigns, or in those systems where a Court's decision could be overcome by a legislature's explicit reaction, like a legislative override, found in both the Canadian and Israeli constitutional systems? 8 The determination of whether a dialogue is formal or substantive results from an empirical and contextual examination of every case in question. The differentiation between the two kinds is more a matter of degree than of dichotomous qualifications. A few indications can help determine which of the two possible dialogues came into being in a specific context, although 76. Search term 'dialogue' at MERRIAM WEBSTER on-line dictionary, available at hup://www.m-w.comfdictionary. him. 77. Indeed, WEBSTER's DICTIONARY defines "formal" as: "of external form or structure, rather than nature or content...." Supra note 75. The legislature's "rubber stamping" can be manifested by repealing the annulled law from the books orby fully implementing the changes the reviewing court has suggested. See infra note 95.
See infra Section V(B).
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they are by no means decisive. For instance, the length of time that the legislature has taken to reach its response is one such indication: if a thorough debate followed the Court's decision, it is likely that considerable time will elapse before the legislature will provide its solution. Balancing the Court's decision and the legislature's will and reaching an appropriate formula can be a difficult task and involves the interaction of many participants. 79 Hence, a relatively prompt legislative response may suggest a more cursory debate. 80 Furthermore, the mise-en-scene surrounding the legislative response is an additional factor to consider: was the response contained in a single piece of legislation or was it a combination of legislative or administrative measures? If so, what were these measures, and why were they taken? Last, the content of the final legislative response should be weighed: if it is identical to the Court's declaration, it should draw our attention. While it is plausible that the legislature will reach the same conclusion as the Court, such an outcome may also indicate a reluctant and uninvolved decision-making process. The Canadian governmental response to the Court's decision in the famous Morgentaler v. Borowski 8 ' case illustrates how the analysis can be exercised in determining which of the two dialogues applies.
In Morgentaler, the Canadian Supreme Court struck down those sections of the Criminal Code dealing with abortion. The parliament did not enact a modified abortion provision. The Court's words were final, in that no legislation followed the Court's declaration. Seemingly, such a response implies the occurrence of a formal dialogue. Yet, a closer look into the parliament's workings after the Morgentaler decision suggests that a substantive dialogue had taken place.
Many commentators acknowledged that the Morgentaler decision left Parliament with a relatively free hand to craft a new abortion law.' Naturally, the Mulroney government introduced a compromise measure. 83 The bill incited lengthy and forceful debates in the House of Commons, the 79. The participants may include: interest groups, the Attorney General's office, and Parliament members.
80. The overall time span in which one examines the dialogue between these institutions could be divided into short-term and long-term interactions. A court's decision to strike down a law can, in the short run, result in the legislature's acquiescence in the Court's definitive answer and yet, in the long run, will result in the legislatures' retaliation, calling to limit the Court's power or to politically control Supreme Court Judges' nominations. See ROBERT F.
NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICANCHARACTER: CENSORING OURSELVES IN AN ANXIOUS
AGE 27-43 (1994) . For the purpose of this paper, only the short-run interactions and reactions will be examined. 
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cabinet, the Senate, and the media, as well as among various interest groups and acadenia.
Eventually, the bill was defeated, and no further attempts to revive the legislation were made. Since Parliament did not respond to the Supreme Court's decision with new legislation, Canada was left with no abortion law, although the Canadian legislature, polarized over the issue, debated at length the alternative legislation the government did initiate. The public dedicated time and energy to discuss and express their opinions on abortions, women's rights, and fetuses' rights. The constitutional dialogue, engendered by the Court's decision, encouraged various participants to engage themselves in the discourse. The final outcome, notwithstanding Morgentaler, resulted in substantial dialogue. While this case represents one sort of substantive dialogue, the next section poses some Israeli and Canadian examples of formal dialogues.
V. FORMAL DIALOGUES IN ACTION
A. The Israeli Example
The aforementioned Israeli case studies exemplify the workings of a formal dialogue, both in the courtroom and in the parliament. This dialogue is most clearly manifested in the events surrounding the Bergman case. 85 In this matter, the Knesset's discussions before the enactment of the impugned law revolved around the system of public financing of election campaigns, examining both its advantages and drawbacks. 86 Neither the constitutionality of the new law nor the possibility of a judicial review were discussed by the legislature. justiciability of the petition or the petitioner's standing, the judicial decision would have been enriched.' The Court's decision on these issues could have engendered a principled public debate on the scope of the Court's authority.' After all, justiciability and standing are substantive issues, cutting to the heart of the proper role of the Court vis-A-vis the other branches of government. 92 The decision to bypass these issues suggests that the governmental agencies were reluctant to enter a comprehensive dialogue on the scope of judicial review that underlies the Israeli Court.' More importantly, the legislature's response to the Israeli Supreme Court's decision also indicates that this dialogue was formal in nature. Recall that the Knesset responded to the Bergman decision in two ways. It first remedied the equality infringement, amending the law by fully adopting the Court's suggestions. In addition, the law was reenacted with a special majority. Together, these actions demonstrate the legislature's lack of interest in participating in a meaningful dialogue.
The legislature should have chosen one out of the two possible alternatives.
Either one of the alternatives was legally sufficient.9 However, by using both of them at the same time, two contradictory positions were implemented. Had the legislature wished to accomplish its original goal Of financing only the incumbent parties, it simply could have reenacted the law with the special majority. Once the procedural steps were taken, the law's validity would have been regained. On the other hand, had the legislature wished to remove the inequality, the law could have been amended with a regular majority. Amending the law and at the same time reenacting it with the required majority implies that the legislature was law approach that compels a court to consider justiciability of an issue and the doubts concerning its own jurisdiction when neither party has raised these points." Benjamin Akzin, Judicial Review of Statute, 4 ISR. L. REv. 576, 577 (1969).
90. In an earlier case in 1955, the Court was asked to issue an order of mandamus against the Israeli President, directing him as to the method of carrying out his duties. See H.C. 65/5 1, Jabotinsky v. Weizmann (1951), 5 P.D. 801 in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 33, Vol. 1. at 75. The then Attorney General claimed that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the petition. The unanimous decision of the five Justices upheld the Attorney General's arguments finding the case non-justiciable (the issue at stake was not whether the Court has jurisdiction, but rather whether the case was justiciable). The Court's rather lengthy decision revolved entirely around the justiciability of the case. Thus, when the Israeli Court was firmly challenged with the justiciability issue, it addressed the question thoroughly. See id 91. On the Court's decision being the beginning point of a societal dialogue see Friedman, supra note 25, at 660-68; Friedman & Smith, supra note 27, at 89.
92. On this specific point see Bendor, supra note 59, at 319. 93. This view is supported by the fact that this strategy prevailed in subsequent cases, even after the government realized that defense policy could result in the decision to strike down laws. While the Attorney General's position in Bergman could be explained by the fact that he positively expected the Court to deny the petition, thereafter such an expectation could not hold; the Attorney General's position remains puzzling.
94. See supra note 62.
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unsure whether it was ready to infringe the equality right to achieve its goal or wished to refrain from violating the equality right altogether. The linking of these somewhat contradictory actions suggests that the Israeli legislature did not thoroughly and deliberately partake in a substantive dialogue. Its response to the Israeli Supreme Court's decision constituted a formal mode of dialogue in which its own genuine voice was not clearly heard. 93 However, the government's response contained an additional component. The amended legislation was introduced simultaneously with another short piece of legislation: the Election (Ratification of Validity of Laws) Law, 9 6 which provided as follows: "(f)or the purpose of removing doubt it is hereby laid down that the provisions contained in the Knesset Election Laws are from the date of their coming into effect valid for every legal proceeding and for every matter and purpose."97 This law was also enacted within two days, and by a special majority, less than two weeks after the Bergman decision was delivered. 98 This last action has been interpreted as a political-legislative reaction against the Court's intervention 99 as well as a proactive removal and prevention of any future possibility of judicial review of Knesset legislation.Y00 While it is a legislative action towards a dialogue that follows a judicial decision to strike down a law," 0 ' such an action nevertheless entails a very confined dialogue and hampers the very possibility of future dialogues on the same matters. Taken together, the legislature's threefold response, amending the law, reenacting it with the required majority, and enacting the 95. It should be mentioned that Hogg & Bushell deliberated whether the cases in which the remedial legislation merely implemented the changes the reviewing Court has suggested should be counted as well as examples of dialogues. See supra note 17, at 98.
96. See Election (Ratification of Validity of Laws) Law, 1969, 568 S.H. 269. 97. Id. See also Shapira, supra note 64, at 414. In the explanatory notes appended to the draft of the law it was stated that "since the decision of the Supreme Court clears the way for argument against the lawfulness of various election laws, it is proposed to confirm the validity of the laws related to electoral matters and to do this by the majority required." Id.
98. The first reading took place on July 14, 1969 and the second and third readings, on July 15, 1969. See The Knesset Protocols, July 14-15, 1969 (in Hebrew).
99. See Elman, supra note 86, at 569. 100. In the Knessets Protocols, the government's representative mentioned: This Rati/ication Law is needed not because we believe there is something else [other laws that might infringe the principles provided in section 4 -g.d.], but because we know what the Supreme Court is. Once a petition was successful, we can expect a flood of unsuccessful petitions that will disturb the Elections. The Knesset Protocols, July 14-15, 1969, at 2 (quoting Knesset Member Yohanan Bader)(in Hebrew, translated by the author). One Knesset Member, Shmuel Tamir, reacted by stating: "This is a law against the Supreme Court, against the Court's supremacy and out of the fear from the rule of law." The Knesset Protocols, July 14, 1969, at 2 (In Hebrew). See also Klinghoffer, supra note 63, at 32 and Editor's synopsis to the Bergman case, in SELECrED JUDGMENTS, supra note 33, at 14.
101. For Hogg & Bushell's definition of a dialogue, see supra note 17, at 82.
[Vol. 1l:l1
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN ACTION
Ratification Law, clearly reveals its reluctance and limited commitment to partaking in a meaningful dialogue. The circumstances surrounding both the Agudat Derekh Eretz'° and the Rubinstein"°3 cases are very similar. In both cases, state representatives persisted in bypassing the justiciability question.1 4 In both cases, the Court struck down the laws that were found to infringe the election equality prescribed in section 4 of the Basic Law: The Knesset. In both cases, the legislature reenacted the laws with the required majority, in haste, and without delving into the substantive constitutional issues raised by the Israeli Supreme Court's decision.
In all these cases, the potential for a substantive dialogue, in which the legislature engages itself in finding an appropriate resolution that balances both the Court's declaration on rights and its own policy-making interests, never materialized.
B. The Canadian Example
Some scholars suggest that the Canadian constitutional model, entrenched in The Charter, is better adapted to deal with countermajoritarianism because. it contains a few features that facilitate the possibility of legislative action to overcome a judicial decision striking down a law.' 0 5 Most prominently, section 33 has been perceived to accommodate and reconcile the competing ideals of entrenched rights and parliamentary supremacy. " Indeed, section 33 (the "Notwithstanding Clause") has the potential for inducing a substantive dialogue. A legislative response to override a Court's decision would evoke a more focused and informed public political debate, thus leading to the better articulation of majority will and values. 7 The Notwithstanding Clause could theoretically play a positive role in the Canadian constitutional system by promoting "a complex partnership through institutional dialogue between supercourts and superlegislatures. "'0 It might also foster a substantive dialogue, as it "actually invigorate(s) majoritarian politics by providing the people and their representatives with a way of engaging in direct discussion of constitutional values in the ordinary course of legislation. " " However, hitherto the practice of section 33 has drawn it closer to the formal type of constitutional dialogue, the forces drawing it in that direction being both those of the legislature and the Canadian Supreme Court.
The Quebec provincial legislature, the first to make use of the Notwithstanding Clause," 0 used it in a very formal manner. Furious over the enactment of the Charter by the other provinces, Quebec reacted by a blanket override: all existing Quebec legislation was repealed and re-enacted with a standard override clause. "' This protest-oriented government was surely not interested in engaging itself in any future dialogues with the Canadian Supreme Court. Similar to the Israeli Ratification Law after the Bergman decision, the Canadian legislature sought to shield its legislation from judicial review and eradicate future interaction and intercommunication between the judicial and legislative institutions.
After the Canadian Supreme Court's decision in Ford v. Quebec
1 2 in which Quebec's Bill 101 (requiring that all public signs and commercial advertising in the province be only in French) was struck down, Quebec invoked section 33 once again. This time section 33 was used to protect a revised version of the law, in which exterior signs in the province had to be only in French, while interior signs could be bilingual. Some legal scholars argue that Premier Bourassa believed the revised law was a constitutionally acceptable compromise." 3 If this was indeed the case, why was the usage of the Notwithstanding Clause necessary? Revising the law 109. Tushnet, supra note 18, at 284 (emphasis added). 110. The Quebec provincial legislature was also the only one to use it so far, except for the Saskatchewan government in a back-to-work law. In that latter case, section 33 was used after the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal had declared a back-to-work law to violate section 2(d) of the Charter. However, the Supreme Court of Canada overturned the Saskatchewan Court's decision and upheld the original law, thus negating the effect of using the section. See Tushnet, supra note 18, at 287. The aftermath of these affairs was the development of a political climate of resistance and antagonism toward the use of section 33. 1 In light of Quebec's rather prodigal use of section 33, the rest of Canada apparently considers the use of section 33 inconceivable."
5 As a consequence, an important component of the Canadian constitution has been eviscerated. The Federal and Provincial legislatures of Canada have chosen to seal off one possible avenue of legitimate, legal legislative response.
The Canadian Supreme Court has also contributed to turning section 33 into a formal mode of dialoguing. In the Ford case,"' the Court found that an omnibus act containing override clauses could be added to pre-existing legislation, and that there is no need for the legislature to specify which of the Charter provisions it is exempting its legislation from. 1 7 The Court's interpretation of the purpose of the clause has entailed an unfocused and formal employment of the legislative decision-making power."' Hence, Quebec, the federal government, the provincial legislatures, and the Supreme Court -all impaired the potential for substantive dialoguing found in section 33.
VI. SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUING
Nonetheless, the overall Canadian experience affords us with ample examples for understanding how substantive dialogues work. The abovementioned Morgentaler example is such a one. " 9 Moreover, in their study, Hogg & Bushell found that in a significant majority of cases the legislature responded to the Court's decision by changing the law in a substantive way.
120
This majority is made up of those cases in which the Court's decision led the political institutions to re-debate the proposed law 118. Tushnet, supra note 18, at 289. "The Court's key analytic tool is its characterization of the override as 'formal."' Weinrib, supra note 108, at 555.
119. Supra notes 81-84, and accompanying texts.
120. Indeed, Hogg and Bushell themselves used the word 'substantive' to describe this majority. See supra note 17, at 98. The majority of cases are reached after excluding the cases in which legislature simply repealed the provision that was found to violate the Charter, or in which the remedial legislation merely implemented the changes the Court has suggested.
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Canada is not alone in its substantive dialoguing experience. Other legal systems, not possessing the Canadian Charter features, have developed their own dialogues' modes and patterns. In the constitutional history of the United States, the striking down of a law by the Court has occasionally spawned proposals for constitutional amendments.1 2 ' At times, it has also brought about deliberation on alternative proposals for new statutes that will restate the legislature's will in a different way."2 Courts' decisions to strike down laws have also evoked responses that result in the curtailment of their importance or consequences," or they have resulted in futile attempts to override Court's decisions. 2 4 Whether these responses were formal or substantive is a matter of empirical analysis, yet at least in some of these cases continuous and profound dialogues developed."1 The responsibility to enter a substantive dialogue should be equally shared by the Court and society at large, its representatives, and its decisionmakers.' 26 For it takes two to tango, it takes at least two to dance to the tune of a valuable dialogue for the benefit of all. If one of the participants refuses to take an active part in the evolving exchange, it will inevitably result in the development of a very restricted dialogue, which is less capable of adequately counteracting counter-majoritarianism. It is within the terrain of a substantive dialogue that the majority's will is reshaped and re-expressed in light of a Court's decision. It is when substantive dialogue takes place that the role of the Court as a facilitator and catalyst of the dialogue comes to life. 27 It is therewith that the Court performs its role not at the expense of, but along with, the elected and representative bodies. However, when the legislature and society are not catalyzed and their participation is not facilitated, the dialogue sought dies and with it the prospect of counteracting the difficulty. If "courts can hamper or chill dialogue,"'2 so can legislatures. The lack of a dialogue can be the outgrowth of either legislatures' or Courts' constraints.
Take the Israeli example; the absence of constitutional dialogue until the late 1970s has been attributed mainly to the Court's self-restraint.' 29 However, as the preceding discussion suggests, this absence could be explained just as easily as the result of a legislature that avoided materially partaking in a nascent dialogue. Even now the willingness of the Knesset to deliberate constitutional issues in the context of such a dialogue is questionable, as the following account indicates. 3 
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explicitly using the notwithstanding clause and forbidding the importing of non-Kosher meat immediately followed. 138 By so doing, the Israeli legislature once again engaged in nothing more than a formal dialogue. Just like the Quebec legislature, it signaled lack of interest in future dialogues with the Court on the matter.
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It used the notwithstanding clause to foreclose any substantive and focused dialogue over the meat issue.
A later petition challenging the constitutionality of the Import of Frozen Meat Law was dismissed. Following the footsteps of the Canadian Supreme Court decision .in Ford while explicitly referring to it, the Israeli Court ruled that a law which included a notwithstanding clause was immune from judicial review."
Once again, the legislature forsook its responsibility to commit itself to a meaningful dialogue.
Fortunately, prospects for a new era of Israeli constitutional dialogue are finally emerging. As mentioned in the introduction, the Supreme Court recently struck down a piece of legislation in the Investment Managers case, finding the impugned provision to impair the freedom of occupation rights of investment managers more than necessary. 4 ' A few months ago, the Knesset responded by amending the law and choosing a less restrictive alternative.
That alternative was the product of its own reasoned if it is included in a law adopted by a majority of the Knesset with the explicit comment that it is validdespite the provisions of this Basic Law; suchalaw shall remain in effect for four years from the date of its commencement, unless an earlier date is fixed. On that occasion, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was also amended. See BarakErez, supra note 10, at 324. After thoroughly examining the happenings that led to the enactment of the 1994 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, Kahana concludes: the political level desired a law that will forbid the importation of non-Kosher meat. The Israeli and Canadian examples raise more profoundly the question of the connection between structure and substance. Does the fact that institutional frameworks are structured in a specific manner have any effect on the substance of the interaction to be developed between courts and legislatures? I extrapolate to the negative.
Substantive dialogues took place in Canada even though a significant institutional framework that was supposed to encourage them -that is, the notwithstanding clause -was almost never used.
1 3 Yet, one may challenge that substantive dialogues took place in Canada altogether; the same overall institutional framework that was supposed to enhance dialogue achieved quite the opposite. It was suggested that the mere power given to the Canadian legislatures to reasonably limit rights (section 1) or override them to a specific period of time (section 33), discouraged the Court's input to the dialogue.'" Recent interpretations slant toward this direction: Canadian judges, it was found, defer to rather than challenge the Canadian parliament.145' Thus, the Canadian model can just as well discourage meaningful dialogue.
The French Constitutional Council's experience produces a puzzling counter-proposition.
Taking as a point of departure that the French Constitutional Council was impressively successful in its contribution to the dialogue,1 4 6 Professor Shapiro suggested that its success is the result of the limited powers vested in the Council. Since its judicial review is restricted to only a one-shot abstract review of future legislation, the Council is 147 Putting aside the differences between. the Canadian and the French Courts' scope of review, both frameworks were constructed in the midst of a long tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, 4 ' and in both the marks of this tradition are forever visible. 149 Hence, if frameworks induce dialogues, one might expect both courts to arrive at more of the same end-point. As mentioned hereinabove, that is not quite what some inferences submit; while the French Council was crowned "fierce", the Canadian Court was said to only rarely challenge parliamentary sovereignty.
The Hungarian Constitutional dialogue can also be referred to in rebuffing the "institutional-influencing-outcome" conjecture. Professor Seitzer posits that the Hungarian Parliament was relatively assertive while ".. not quite as readily raise the white flag in conflicts with the Constitutional Court . . . [but instead] crafts legislation that pushes the envelope of its permissible discretion."' 5 0 Yet, as Professor Seitzer himself points out, the Hungarian Constitutional features, with their far greater potential intervention upon policy-making, should have entailed a more formal dialogue, in which the legislature is more prone to acquiesce to the Court's authoritarian decision. ' Without structural clauses similar to the Canadian's, the Hungarian Parliament was successful in reshaping its will, twice or even three times, until it was found constitutional by the Court.' 52 Deprived from "notwithstanding" or "reasonable limitation" clauses, the Hungarian legislature managed to instate itself as a full participant in substantive dialogues that have produced constitutional statutes, accepted by both the Court and the political branches.
The Israeli case study is more complex. First, Israel has not yet adopted an encompassing, written constitution. This fact alone should exclude it from being put in the constitutional dialogue category altogether. However, as the British example contends, dialogues occur, even if to a lesser extent, in non-constitutional polities in the form of administrative discretion review. ' 53 Only in Israel might it be fairly said that constitutional rights have generated judicial review. Indeed, in Israel the Supreme Court has'generated a constitutional law of rights and judicial review to enforce those rights in the face of a dramatic failure even to promulgate a constitution. Israel can join Italy in our anomalies bag.
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Thus, the absence of a constitution could not account, at least not alone, for the lack of the development of substantive dialogues.
In an attempt to systematically explain the emergence and institutionalization of constitutional dialogues and judicial review, Professor Shapiro raises, and somewhat disqualifies, three possible hypotheses: the Federalism-English hypothesis, the division of powers hypothesis and the rights hypothesis.' s
5
What is intriguing in his attempt is the number of countries that were put, for a time being or for life, in the "anomalies bag": Italy, France, Spain, Israel, and the ECHR. 5 6 For a moment or two, it felt as if the United States was the only one to be found in the "anomaly bag", making the possible generalization of the structure and outcome connection almost impossible. If "so many parts of the world entrust so much of their governance to judges," 57 the importance of different frameworks, adopted by different constitutional structures, is withered.
At the end of the day, what matters is the legal and political culture, held by the country's leaders and people. These are the factors influencing the institutional design of one's constitution and the features that were adopted from the various possibilities. They are the ones to effect the political branches' dialogues and responses, and they are the ones to be embedded in judicial decisions.' 8 Why then, have substantive constitutional dialogues emerged in Canada and formal ones reigned the Israeli landscape? One important element is the elite's attitude and political culture towards the rule of law.' 5 9 Canada, as 
